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Abstract 
The question addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Thunder Cats Investment 92 (Pty) Ltd v Nkonjane Economic 
Prospecting & Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 1 (SCA) 
(hereafter the "Thunder Cats") provides much-needed guidance 
on the deadlock principle as well as the breadth and scope of the 
"just and equitable ground for winding up in terms of 
s 81(1)(d)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The facts, the 
issues and the contextual authority of Thunder Cats also bring to 
fore the lacuna in the just and equitable winding up provisions of 
the current Companies Act which lacuna has so far received no 
judicial or academic consideration. This Note contends the fact 
that the just and equitable winding up provisions do not 
countenance any deviation from the statutory prescriptions once 
the factual grounds for just and equitable winding up have been 
established is not in consonance with the spirit, purport and 
objects of Companies Act, and, in particular those of Chapter Six 
of the Act which have introduced the innovative business rescue 
scheme into South African corporate law landscape. The facts, 
the issues and the contextual authority of Thunder Cats will be 
reviewed at length in the ensuing discussion. 
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1 Introduction 
Until fairly recently, the winding up provisions in sections 79 to 81 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 20081 in respect of solvent companies had attracted 
relatively little attention from the courts. However, with the burgeoning 
business rescue jurisprudence in the South African corporate law 
landscape,2 the provisions pertaining to winding up on the just and equitable 
ground are increasingly being tested before the courts.3 An order for the 
winding up of a solvent company is a drastic and draconian remedy.4 It has 
been aptly described as a "bludgeon".5 For the purposes of the thesis 
advanced in this paper, it is especially significant that the judicial discretion 
                                            
* Tumo Charles Maloka. BA, LLB, LLM (UCT). Senior Lecturer, Nelson R Mandela 
School of Law, (UFH). Email: tmaloka@ufh.ac.za. 
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1  Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the 2008 Act). 
2  Generally Richter v Bloem CC 2014 6 SA 38 (GP); Absa Bank Ltd v Summer Lodge 
(Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 90 (GNP); Absa Bank v Makuna Farm CC 2014 3 SA 86 (GJ); Ex 
parte Nell 2014 6 SA 545 (G); Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products 2013 4 SA 630 
(GNP); Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate 2012 2 SA 378 (WCC); 
Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothsfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 2013 4 
SA 539 (SCA). For a sampling of prominent works: Loubser Corporate Rescue; 
Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ; Loubser 2010a TSAR; Loubser 2010b TSAR; Loubser 
2008 SA Merc LJ; Loubser 2004 SA Merc LJ; Bradstreet 2013 SALJ; Bradstreet 2010 
SA Merc LJ; Bradstreet 2011 SALJ; Bradstreet "Navigating Kariba"; Bradstreet and 
Klopper 2014 Stell LR; Kloppers 2001 SA Merc LJ; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica; 
Burdette 2004a SA Merc LJ; Burdette 2004b SA Merc LJ; Joubert 2013 THRHR; 
Locke 2015 SA Merc LJ; Osode 2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs; Lombard and Swart 2015 THRHR.  
3  See generally Knipe v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 52 (FB); Scania Finance SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Thom-Gee Rood 2013 2 SA 439 (FB); Herman v Set-Mak Civils CC 2013 
1 SA 386 (FB); Cilliers v Duin & See (Pty) Ltd 2012 4 SA 203 (WCC); Budge v Midnight 
Storm Investments 2012 2 SA 28 (GSJ); HBT Constructors v Uniplant Hire CC 2012 
5 SA 197 (FB). 
4  Section 81 of the 2008 Act provides that a court may order the winding up of a solvent 
company where the company has resolved by a special resolution that it be wound up 
by the court (s (a)(i)); or has applied to have its voluntary winding-up continued by the 
court (s (a)(ii)). The court may further order the winding up of a solvent company where 
the practitioner appointed during business rescue proceedings applies for liquidation 
in terms of s 141(2)(a) on the ground that there is no reasonable prospect of the 
company being rescued (s 81(1)(b)). Ss 82 and 83 deal with the deregistration of 
companies. For serious scholarly engagement: Matlala Deregistration and Dissolution 
of Companies. 
5  Re Levine Developments (Israel) Ltd 1978 5 BLR 164, 172. 
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to grant equitable relief is not unbounded. It must be exercised judicially, on 
a principled basis, and in recognition of the courts' disinclination to interfere 
lightly in the internal affairs of a company. Consequently, the applicant bears 
a formidable onus of establishing that a winding up order is warranted on 
the ground that such an order would be just and equitable.  
The question addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Thunder Cats 
Investments 92 (Pty) Ltd v Nkonjane Economic Prospecting & Investments 
(Pty) Ltd6 provides much-needed guidance on the deadlock principle as well 
as the breadth and scope of the "just and equitable" ground for winding up. 
The factual matrix in Thunder Cats may be stated briefly.7 The appellants 
sought to appeal a winding up order granted in terms of section 81(1)(d) (iii) 
due to shareholders' impasse in Thunder Cats, the first respondent 
company whose main asset was an 11% shareholding in Ntsimbintle Mining 
(Pty) Ltd worth R132 million. The parties challenging the winding up order 
were Thunder Cats and Turquoise Moon Trading 8 (Pty) Ltd. In support of 
the winding up order were the second and third respondents, who were the 
successful applicants in the court below, namely Bosasa Operations (Pty) 
Ltd and Bosasa Youth Development Centres (Pty) Ltd, each holding 25% 
of the issued shares in Nkonjane. The warring parties were equipollent at 
management and shareholder level. In other words, the appellants' 
nominees and the respondents' nominees each had 50% of the vote at both 
board and management level. The shareholders appointed directors who 
vote in blocks in proportion to their shareholding. The rights of the 
shareholders to dispose of their shares were limited so that a shareholder 
could not sell its shares without the approval of other shareholders. The 
facts, the issues and the contextual authority of Thunder Cats will be 
reviewed at length in the ensuing discussion. 
2  The statutory framework 
The pertinent statutory provisions of section 81(1)(d)(i)-(iii) provide that a 
court may order a solvent company to be wound up if the company, one or 
more directors or one or more shareholders have applied to the court for an 
order to wind up the company on the grounds that- 
(i) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the company, and the 
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and – 
(aa) irreparable injury to the company is resulting, or may result, from the 
deadlock; or 
                                            
6  Thunder Cats Investment 92 (Pty) Ltd v Nkonjane Economic Prospecting and 
Investment (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 1 (SCA), hereafter referred to as "Thunder Cats". 
7  Thunder Cats para 1. 
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(bb) the company's business cannot be conducted to the advantage of 
shareholders generally, as a result of the deadlock; 
(ii) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed for a 
period that includes at least two consecutive annual general meeting dates, 
to elect successors to directors whose terms expired; or 
(iii) it is otherwise just and equitable for the company to be wound up … .8 
The "just and equitable" phrase is found in a number of related pieces of 
legislation9 as well as in the remedial provisions of the 1996 Constitution.10 
If not quite ubiquitous, then the phrase is at least exceedingly well-
travelled.11 The words "just and equitable" are intended to be elastic in their 
application to allow the courts to intervene to relieve against an injustice or 
inequity.12 A court retains a broad discretion to make a winding-up order 
under section 81(1)(c) and (d) or any other order it considers appropriate. 
In its application, the just and equitable ground does not admit of a strict 
categorical approach. As Ponnan JA observed in Apco Africa v Apco 
Worldwide Inc,13 "there is no necessary limit to the words 'just and 
                                            
8  The precursor to s 81(1)(d)(i)-(iii) of the 2008 Act, s 344(h) of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973, provided that a company may be wound up by the court when it is "just and 
equitable" to do so. 
9  Section 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 provides that the court will grant an eviction order only if it is of the 
opinion that it is "just and equitable to do so" after considering all the relevant 
circumstances, including the rights and needs of children, the elderly, disabled 
persons and households headed by women. See generally City of Johannesburg v 
Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) para 12; Johannesburg Housing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the Newton Urban Village 2013 1 SA 
583 (GSJ) paras 33-50. Also see Strydom and Viljoen 2014 PER/PELJ 1207-1261. S 
89(5)(b) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 reads as follows: "If a credit agreement 
is unlawful in terms of this section, despite any other legislation or any provision of an 
agreement to the contrary, a court must make a just and equitable order..." Also see 
Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson 2015 ZACC 15 (5 June 2015) para 34. 
10  Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides 
that following upon a declaration of constitutional invalidity a court "may make any 
order that is just and equitable". See e.g. AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). For sustained engagement see: 
Sonnekus 2014 TSAR; Osode 2013 http://tinyurl.com/jherbhq; Okpaluba 2003 Stell 
LR; Okpaluba 2002 SAPR/PL 124-129. 
11  Section 8(1) of the Human Rights Act, 1998 (UK) provides that where the court finds 
that an act of a public authority is unlawful, it "may grant such relief or remedy, or make 
such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate". In the same breadth, 
see s 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990; s 5 of the Hong Kong Human 
Rights Act, 1991 both of which share similar wording to s 24(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. These provisions use the terms "appropriate 
and just" or "just and appropriate" to qualify the wide discretionary powers the courts 
may exercise in considering the remedies to vindicate these statutorily and 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. See further Okpaluba 2006 SAPR/PL. 
12  Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 1972 2 All ER 492 (HL) 500A-H; Moosa v Mavjee 
Bhawan (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 131 (T) 136H-I. 
13  Apco Africa v Apco Worldwide Inc 2008 5 SA 615 (SCA). Also see Davis & Co Ltd v 
Brunswick (Australia) Ltd 1936 1 All ER 299 (PC); Re Rogers and Agincourt Holdings 
Ltd 1976 14 OR (2d) 489, 493. 
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equitable"'. A court must be careful not to construe the authorities as setting 
out a series of restrictive principles which would confine the phrase "just and 
equitable" to rigid categories.14 Each case depends to a large extent on its 
own facts. The judicial inquiry must extend beyond an examination of the 
legal rights of the shareholder to include a broader spectrum of equitable 
rights.15 
The decisive question therefore is: When is it "just and equitable" for the 
court to order that a company be wound up on the "just and equitable" 
ground? The answer to this question emerges from certain principles distilled 
from the cases which have considered the just and equitable ground since 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.16 The ground is usually applied in four 
situations: (1) where there has been a disappearance of substratum; (2) 
where there exists justifiable lack of confidence among members; (3) where, 
in practical terms, the relationship resembles that of a partnership and lacks 
the protection of a more formal corporate structure; and (4) where the 
parties are deadlocked. The partnership analogy and deadlock are 
commonly relied upon to justify judicial intervention. This is because the 
deadlock and partnership analogy are broad in scope and, at the same time, 
they are the easiest categories to satisfy in terms of proof. Thunder Cats is 
emblematic of the deadlock principle envisaged several decades ago in Re 
Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd17 for scenarios where in substance a partnership 
exists in the guise of company. The analogy to this could be found in the 
familiar questions which English and other Commonwealth courts have 
grappled with for decades. 
                                            
14  See generally Sweet v Finbain 1984 3 SA 441 (W); Sunny South Canners (Pty) Ltd v 
Mbangxa 2001 2 SA 49 (SCA); Re Rogers and Agincourt Holdings Ltd 1976 74 DLR 
3d 152, 156; Eiserman v Ara Farms Ltd 1988 52 DLR 4th 498; Resnick v Bilecki 1986 
49 Sask R 232.  
15  Erasmus v Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 178 (W) 181C-H. For further 
discussion: Cassim "Shareholder Remedies" 757-823; Peterson Shareholder 
Remedies para 20.33; Koehnen Oppression and Related Remedies 396-397. 
16  Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 1972 2 All ER 492 (HL). 
17  In Re Yenidje Tobacco Co 1916 2 Ch 426 it was submitted that the deadlock principle 
is "founded on the analogy of partnership and is strictly confined to those small 
domestic companies in which, because of some arrangement, express, tacit or 
implied, there exists between the members in regard to the company's affairs a 
particular personal relationship of confidence and trust similar to that existing between 
partners in regard to the partnership business". 
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3 Deadlock 
In Palmieri v AC Paving Co Ltd18 Levine J (as she then was) provided a 
succinct statement of the types of situations in which it will be just and 
equitable to order a winding up on the grounds of deadlock:19 
Some of the circumstances ... that will lead to a finding that it is just and 
equitable to wind up the company because of deadlock are: there are no other 
effective and appropriate remedies; there is an equal split or nearly equal split 
of shares and control; there is a serious and persistent disagreement as to 
some important questions respecting the management or functioning of the 
corporation; there is a resulting deadlock; and the deadlock paralyzes and 
seriously interferes with the normal operations of the corporation. 
The shareholder feud and impasse in Thunder Cats is not too dissimilar to 
the corporate stalemate in Apco Africa and Kinzie v Dell Holdings.20 In 
Thunder Cats shareholders were hopelessly at loggerheads. The 
shareholder relationship was strained from the moment the respondents 
gave notice of their intention to extricate themselves from Nkonjane. They 
could not do so because the provision in the shareholder agreement dealing 
with the disposal of shares required that all other shareholders consent 
thereto in writing. The appellants were unwilling to consent to the 
respondents selling their shares or to meet to discuss a reasonable basis 
for their leaving the company. The appellants considered disinvestment 
before Ntsimbintle began mining and disposing of its minerals as likely to 
diminish the full value of their long-term investment. The strain on the 
parties' relationship intensified as time went on. 
The obstructive conduct of both sides did little to help the situation. 
Mediation efforts floundered due to the confrontational attitude of the 
warring shareholders. The internal wrangling, mutual disillusionment and 
distrust, and the consequent breakdown of the relationship between the 
shareholders paralysed the company. The shareholder agreement could 
not provide a resolution to the stalemate as there was no deadlock breaking 
method such as the Texas Auction clause.21 Clause 8.2 dealing with 
deadlock at board level excluded the inability to obtain the required vote at 
                                            
18  Palmieri v AC Paving Co Ltd 1999 48 BLR (2d) 130 (BCSC). 
19  Palmieri v AC Paving Co Ltd 1999 48 BLR (2d) 130 (BCSC) para 28. 
20  Kinzie v Dell Holdings 2010 BCSC 1360. 
21  A Texas Auction is conducted as follows: The unanimous consent of directors 
appointed by shareholders or where appropriate, the unanimous consent of 
shareholders in general meeting of the Company, shall be required for a resolution to 
be of any force or effect if the resolution provides for: the company to change the 
nature of or discontinue its business; the company to dispose of or otherwise deal in 
or with the whole or any part of its assets or undertaking except in the ordinary course 
of business. 
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board meetings as a ground for winding up the company. If there was a 
reasonable hope of tiding over the period of deep conflict and of Nkonjane 
emerging from its malaise to carry on at a profit, there may well have been 
insufficient reason for a court to wind up the company on the just and 
equitable provision. However, the evidence showed a justifiable breakdown 
of mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders regarding the 
conduct and management of the company's affairs. In particular, the state 
of animosity precluded all reasonable hope of cooperation in the attainment 
of the company's financial goals. 
The facts and issues for determination by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Apco Africa v Apco Worldwide Incorporated22 appropriately capture the 
problem of deadlock. The somewhat simple question confronting Ponnan 
JA was whether the first appellant, Apco Africa (Pty) Ltd ("the Company"), 
ought to be wound up on the ground that this course was just and equitable 
within the meaning of section 344(h) of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
or more accurately, whether such an order was properly granted by the 
court below. Briefly, the company was set up as a joint venture partnership 
between the second appellant, Arcay Communications Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
("Arcay") and the respondent, Apco Worldwide Inc. The appellant and 
respondent held interest in the company in the same proportion. Apco was 
to refer clients' work required to be performed on the African continent to 
the company. The residual profit generated by the company was to be 
shared on an equal footing while the directors seconded by Arcay were to 
manage the affairs of the company. 
The parties disagreed from the outset on important corporate decisions and 
Arcay's response to matters relating to performance and accountability. 
There were complaints from disgruntled clients concerning the services 
rendered by the company. Another bone of contention was the fact that 
Arcay had been appropriating for itself 90% of the revenue generated by the 
company. A director seconded by Apco to help salvage matters was met 
with hostility by the local directors of the company. As result of animosity 
and altercation with the company's local directors, she had to operate from 
another office until the dispute between the shareholders could be resolved. 
The flurry of court applications involving shareholders underscored the 
failure of the business relationship. Several attempts by the respondent to 
convene a shareholders' meeting in order to discuss its exit proved futile. 
As a result, the company lost its ability to function and the board became 
unable to take decisions. It is submitted that the state of affairs prevailing in 
                                            
22  Apco Africa v Apco Worldwide Inc 2008 5 SA 615 (SCA). 
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the company would compel any court to exercise its discretion to wind up 
the company on the just and equitable basis. 
The judgment of the British Columbia Supreme Court in the Canadian case 
of Dell Holdings23 provides another illustration of a corporate deadlock 
justifying liquidation on equitable grounds in terms of section 324 of the 
Business Corporations Act of British Columbia.24 As in Thunder Cats and 
Apco Africa, the two warring shareholder groups were, in fact, agreed that 
there was a deadlock in the management of the affairs of the company and 
that there was no suitable mechanism for resolving it. Dell Holdings owned 
and operated a shopping centre. Its income was derived entirely from the 
rents collected under the various lease agreements in place with retailers in 
the mall. An intractable dispute arose in connection with efforts which were 
being made by the shareholders to sell the shopping centre for 
redevelopment purposes. While the applicants in Dell Holdings were not 
opposed to a sale of the shopping centre to a third party, they disagreed 
with the insistence of the respondents that any new leases contain a 
demolition clause.25 The respondents were of the view that in the absence 
of a demolition clause, developers would be disinclined to purchase the 
shopping centre due to the substantial pay-outs that would otherwise be 
required to terminate a tenant's lease. As a consequence of this 
disagreement, the parties were unable to present a common front to 
prospective purchasers. The difference of opinion led to conflict between 
the opposing shareholder groups during negotiations with a grocery chain 
seeking to lease a sizable space in the mall. The disagreement was found 
by Bruce J to be "paralyzing the proper management of Dell's business 
affairs".26 Accordingly, relief was granted in the form of a shot-gun sale.27 
                                            
23  Kinzie v Dell Holdings 2010 BCSC 1360. 
24  Section 324 of the Business Corporations Act, 2002 provides as follows: "324(1) On 
an application made in respect of the company by the company, a shareholder of the 
company, a beneficial owner of a share of the company, a director of the company or 
any other person, including a creditor of the company, whom the court considers to be 
an appropriate person to make the application, the court may order that the company 
be liquidated and dissolved if: (a) an event occurs on the occurrence of which the 
memorandum or the articles of the company provide that the company is to be 
liquidated and dissolved, or (b) the court otherwise considers it just and equitable to 
do so. (3) If the court considers that an applicant for an order referred to in subsection 
(1) (b) is a person who is entitled to relief either by liquidating and dissolving the 
company or under section 227, the court may do one of the following: (a) make an 
order that the company be liquidated and dissolved; (b) make any order under section 
227(3) it considers appropriate." 
25  Kinzie v Dell Holdings 2010 BCSC 1360 para 5. 
26  Kinzie v Dell Holdings 2010 BCSC 1360 para 11. 
27  Subsection 227(3) of the of the Business Corporations Act, 2002 provides that: "On 
an application under this section, the court may, with the view to remedying or bringing 
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As noted above, for a winding up order to be justified on the grounds of 
deadlock, there must be a serious and persistent disagreement on some 
important questions respecting the management or functioning of the 
company and a deadlock which has the effect of paralysing or seriously 
interfering with its normal operations.28 This brings to focus the partnership 
analogy, that is, circumstances in which it may be appropriate to apply the 
kind of equitable considerations that govern the dissolution of partnerships 
to applications to wind up the business of a company. 
4  The partnership analogy 
Where the relationship between the parties resembles a partnership 
between more than arm's length shareholders such that it can be said that 
the entity is, in substance, a partnership in the guise of a private company, 
courts have been prepared in some circumstances to liquidate a corporation 
on the same grounds that would justify the winding up of a partnership.29 In 
determining to apply the partnership analogy in the famous English case of 
Ebrahimi,30 Lord Wilberforce made it clear in his judgment that it was a fact 
of "cardinal importance" to the determination of that case that, prior to its 
incorporation, the business had been carried on by the shareholders as a 
partnership, with each partner equally sharing the management and profits 
of the firm. The equitable intervention of the court on the "partnership 
analogy" ground requires the satisfaction of two conditions: firstly, the 
existence of an undertaking that is in substance a partnership in the guise 
of a private company, and secondly, a breakdown of the mutual trust and 
confidence upon which the original undertaking was founded.31 
Two Canadian decisions further illustrate this principle. Kurt v Pryde32 
concerned former spouses and equal shareholders in a trucking company. 
Kurt was in charge of administrative support while Pryde led the service 
operations of the company. Importantly, the parties agreed that they could 
not, following their divorce, continue to work closely together in the 
company. The applicant, Kurt, wished to realise on her interest in the 
                                            
to an end the matters complained of and subject to subsection (4) of this section, make 
any interim or final order it considers appropriate, including an order: (a) directing or 
prohibiting any act, … (h) directing any shareholder to purchase some or all of the 
shares of any other shareholder, … (o) directing that the company be liquidated and 
dissolved, and appointing one or more liquidators, with or without security." Emphasis 
added. 
28  Palmieri v AC Paving Co Ltd 1999 48 BLR (2d) 130 (BCSC) para 28. 
29  Golden Pheasant Holding Corp v Synergy Corporate Management 2011 BCSC 173. 
30  Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 1972 2 All ER 492 (HL). 
31  Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 1972 2 All ER 492 (HL) 495. 
32  Kurt v Pryde 2007 160 ACWS (3d) 94 (Ont SC). 
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business, proceed on her separate way and pursue a career in real estate 
sales. She brought an application to wind up the affairs of the company. 
Although both parties recognized that a winding up order was not in their 
respective best interests, the judgment reflects an inability on their part to 
compromise in their respective positions. The Ontario Supreme Court 
declined to issue a winding up order but instead imposed a framework for 
the voluntary purchase by Pryde of Kurt's interest in the company.  
In Paulson v Dogwood Holdings Ltd,33 a case which has some features in 
common with the case at bar, the court found no evidence of a breakdown 
in trust and confidence between the shareholders to warrant winding up on 
deadlock grounds. The shares of Dogwood Holdings were held equally by 
Paulson and Dorothy Dawson. Paulson's application for a winding up order 
was motivated by a desire to liquidate his investment in the company and 
satisfy his creditors. As in Kurt v Pryde,34 there was no question that 
Dogwood Holdings, which had been incorporated 27 years earlier, was a 
profitable endeavour. The Articles of the company provided that either 
shareholder had the right to sell his or her shares to a third party, subject to 
the other shareholder's right of first refusal. Paulson had made unsuccessful 
efforts to dispose of his shares to third parties. He offered Dorothy a shot-
gun buyout whereby he would sell his shares to her at a fixed price or buy 
hers at that price if she declined his offer. She refused to do either. Paulson 
also sought Dorothy's concurrence in the sale of the company's assets to 
an interested third party purchaser. But she would not agree to the sale. 
Paulson's application for a winding up order rested on a contention that the 
affairs of the company were in deadlock or, alternatively, that it was 
justifiable on the partnership analogy ground.  
It is in this regard that the judgement of the court of first instance in Thunder 
Cats is instructive for applying the partnership analogy to the shareholder 
relationship that had been clearly marred by difficulty and disagreement.35 
According to the High court, the application of the just and equitable ground 
does not require a finding that the company was in fact a partnership or 
"quasi-partnership", but rather requires a finding that it has some of the 
attributes that also describe a partnership. In importing the partnership 
analogy to Nkonjane, Vermeulen J took into consideration the fact that the 
company comprised of only four members, each having the right to appoint 
a director. Each of the shareholders had the right to participate in the 
                                            
33  Paulson v Dogwood Holdings Ltd 1990 BCJ No 2281 (SC). 
34  Kurt v Pryde 2007 160 ACWS (3d) 94 (Ont SC). 
35  Thunder Cats para 2. 
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management of the company. Furthermore, there was no body of 
shareholders separate from the board. In the view of Vermeulen J, no deep 
analysis was required but rather the bare facts spoke for themselves. Not 
surprisingly, the court concluded that the disagreement between the 
shareholders affected the operation of the company so as to impair the 
attainment of its economic ends. In those circumstances it seemed just and 
equitable to dissolve the company pursuant to the relevant legislative 
provision.36 
5 Clean hands 
There can be no dispute that the contribution of the contending parties to 
the breakdown of the relationship is a weighty factor. Thus the question 
arises: to what extent is the degree of the moral turpitude attributable to the 
applicant for winding up material to the enquiry whether it is just and 
equitable to liquidate the company? This leads squarely to the argument 
pressed by the appellants in Thunder Cats in their challenge against the 
granting of the winding up order. It was contended that as the respondents 
were the causa causans of the management paralysis, they could not insist 
upon the company being wound up.  
It is a cardinal principle that in the interpretation of the "just and equitable" 
ground, general rules regarding equitable remedies apply such that a 
person seeking relief must come to court with "clean hands".37 It is a 
principle that Lord Mildew expressed equally well, if less decorously: "A dirty 
dog will get no dinner from the courts".38 Echoes of the clean hands doctrine 
are legion in a variety of cases.39 For example, the clean hands principle 
has been invoked to bar a minority shareholder's derivative action.40 
                                            
36  See Muller v Lilly Valley Ltd 2012 1 All SA 187 (SGJ). 
37  See generally Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 406-417; Anenson 2010-2011 
Ky LJ 63; Kennedy 1997 U Det Mercy L Rev 609; Chafee 1947 Mich L Rev 877. 
38  French Plays Ltd v The Mayor of Hackney 1910 2 KB. The US Supreme Court in 
Keystone Drilller Co v General Excavator Co 290 US 240, 244-45 (1933) articulated 
unclean hands as follows: "Whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial 
machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, 
or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the door of the court will be shut 
against him in mimine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge 
his right, or to award him any remedy". 
39  Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 838 (LAC); Kylie v CCMA 2008 9 BLLR 970 (LC) (a claim 
for unfair dismissal by a sex worker); Essop v Abdullah 1988 1 SA 424 (A) (a claim for 
specific performance); Brits v Van Heerden 2001 3 SA 257 (C) (rectification of an 
illegal contract). 
40  Payne 2002 CLJ 76; Peterson Shareholder Remedies para 20-33. See further 
Amdoes v Kwezi Technologies 2014 5 SA 532 (GJ); Mourutzen v Greystone 
Enterprises 2012 5 SA 74 (KZD).  
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Similarly, in determining whether it is just and equitable to liquidate a 
company, the court will take into account the fact that the applicant's hands 
are not completely clean, and this is so when the reason for the breakdown 
of the parties' relationship is the result of his or her own misconduct. It 
follows that a party who is responsible for the collapse of the relationship is 
precluded from seeking the liquidation of a company.41 
Trite and obviously necessary as this equity principle may be, it must not be 
thought of as being of universal application. If the rigid application of the 
clean hands principle would work manifest unfairness on one of the parties, 
a departure would be justified on the grounds that "public policy should 
properly take into account the doing of simple justice between man and 
man".42 Where all the parties lack clean hands, the policy behind the clean 
hands doctrine is not applicable. The Australian case of Ruut v Head,43 
where the warring partners were at fault, affirms the principled view that the 
lack of cleans hands is not decisive of the question whether it was just and 
equitable to grant a winding up order, but Santow J added that "it must be 
an important factor in the exercise of the court's discretion along with other 
factors, such as whether the partnership is truly deadlocked".44 It should be 
remembered that at stake here is the best interests of the company. Where 
a company is effectively deadlocked and paralysed, the granting of an order 
for dissolution coupled with the appointment of a liquidator may be the only 
viable option for bringing an end to the paralysis and securing the 
company's best interests.45 
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Appeal could not find fault with the 
reasoning of Vermuelen AJ that both parties were culpable for the inevitable 
breakdown of the relationship. In other words, the court a quo had thought 
that "an equal apportionment of blameworthiness might be somewhat 
charitable to the appellants but not an outright injustice to the 
respondents".46 Moreover, the agreement reached at the meeting of 
                                            
41  See eg Sevaal Holdings Inc v LCB Properties Inc 2014 SKQB 47 (CanLII) para 89; 
Safarik v Ocean Fisheries Ltd 1995 12 BCLR (3d) 369-70; Apco Africa v Apco 
Worldwide Inc 2008 5 SA 615 (SCA) para 19; Emphy v Pacer Properties (Pty) Ltd 
1979 3 SA 363 (D) 368G-I; Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 492 
(HL) at 387G-H. 
42  Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537. Also see Petersen v Jajbhay 1940 TPD 82; Klokow 
v Sullivan 2006 1 SA 259 (SCA). See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 177-182. 
43  Ruut v Head 1996 20 CSR 160. Also see Portfolios of Distinction Ltd v Laird 2004 2 
BCLC 741; Konamaneni v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd 2002 1 WLR 1269. 
44  Ruut v Head 1996 20 CSR 160 162 cited with approval in Thunder Cats para 28. 
45  Pham Thai Duc v PTS Australian Distributor Pty Ltd 2005 NSWC 98 para 17 cited with 
approval in Thunder Cats para 28. 
46  Thunder Cats para 29. 
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shareholders after the launching of the liquidation application underscored 
the point that both parties were to blame for the irrevocable breakdown of 
their relationship. In a sense, the most appropriate qualifier to the paralysis 
that haunted the company was winding up. Malan JA on behalf of a 
unanimous SCA, held:47 
The shareholder agreement and the equal holding of shares and voting power 
on the board require the shareholders to co-operate. Without such co-
operation the company cannot function. It was not possible to meet and 
approve the financial statements for the year ending February 2010. In these 
circumstances their relationship has broken down irretrievably and the court 
below correctly found that it was just and equitable that the company be wound 
up. 
6  Conclusion 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Thundercats is welcomed 
for three obvious reasons. First, it has provided a much-needed clarification 
on the breadth and scope of the "just and equitable ground" in terms of 
section 81(1)(d)(iii) of the 2008 Act. Second, it has elucidated the extent to 
which the clean hands doctrine may bar the granting of just and equitable 
relief. Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeal spared the evolving just and 
equitable jurisprudence the confusion inherent in the conflicting opinions 
held by different Divisions of the High Court as to whether the just and 
equitable relief in section 81(1)(d)(iii) was as wide as it had been under 
section 344(h) of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973, or was limited by sub-
paragraph (i) and (ii) so as to preclude all other grounds of deadlock.  
The discussion of selected Canadian case law brings to the fore a more 
imaginative approach and the existence of a wide range of substantive 
remedies to tackle deadlock situations. The judicial approach to resolving 
corporate paralysis in Canada by ordering a shotgun sale, exemplified in 
cases such as Dell Holdings and Kurt v Pryde, casts an illuminating light on 
the lacuna in the just and equitable winding up provisions of the current 
South African Companies Act, which lacuna has so far received no judicial 
or academic consideration. Certainly, the courts in Canada, unlike their 
                                            
47  Thunder Cats para 33. 
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South African counterparts, have a wide range of remedies available to 
them to deal with companies overwhelmed by deadlock. It can hardly be 
argued that if there was a shot-gun sale provision within the all-
encompassing provisions of section 81(1)(d)(iii),48 the courts in Thunder 
Cats would have declined to grant a winding up order and instead ordered 
a disposal of shares, since the respondents had desired to liquidate their 
investments. It is submitted that a shot-gun sale, beyond giving primacy to 
the solvent company's best interests, equally gives due consideration to the 
interests of other stakeholders such as employees. In this respect, the fact 
that the just and equitable winding up provisions of the 2008 Act do not 
countenance any deviation from the statutory prescriptions once the factual 
grounds for just and equitable winding up have been established is not in 
consonance with the spirit, purport and objects of Companies Act,49 and, 
especially those of Chapter Six of the Act, which have introduced the 
business rescue scheme into South African company law.50 
                                            
48  A court directs a transfer or sale of shares only if a shareholder of a company seeks 
relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from the abuse of a separate juristic 
personality in terms of s 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. See Peel v Hamon 
J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 331 (GSJ). 
49  According to section 7(b)(c)(d) and (f), the purposes of the Act include:(b) promotion 
of the development of the South African economy encouraging entrepreneurship and 
enterprise efficiency,(c) promotion of innovation and investment in the South African 
markets (d) reaffirm the concept of company as a means of achieving economic and 
social benefits (f) promotion of the development of companies within all sectors of the 
economy, and encouragement of active participation in economic organisation, 
management and productivity.  
50  This was made clear by the High Court in Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country 
Estate 2012 2 SA 378 (WCC) para 14 as follows: "It is clear that the Legislature has 
recognised that the liquidation of companies more frequently than not occasions 
significant collateral damage, both economically and socially, with attendant 
destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is obvious that it is in the public interest that 
the incidence of such adverse socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where 
reasonably possible. Business rescue is intended to serve that public interest by 
providing a remedy directed at avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations". 
See also Osode 2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 459; and 
Osode "Challenging the Rejection of a Business Rescue Plan". A contrary but robust 
pro-creditor approach to business rescue has been espoused in some cases. For eg 
African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 
2015 5 SA 192 (SCA) para 25; DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz 2014 1 SA 
103 (KZP) paras 40-41; Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein 
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 2013 4 SA 539 (SCA) para 23; AG Petzetakis International 
Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 515 (GS) paras 13, 14; Swart v 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  15 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Anenson 2010-2011 Ky LJ 
Anenson TL "Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands" 
2010-2011 Ky LJ 63 
Bradstreet 2010 SA Merc LJ 
Bradstreet R "The Leak in the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of 
Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely Affect Lenders' Willingness 
and the Growth of the Economy" 2010 SA Merc LJ 195-213 
Bradstreet 2011 SALJ 
Bradstreet R "The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?" 
2011 SALJ 352-380 
Bradstreet 2013 SALJ 
Bradstreet R "Business Rescue Proves to be Creditor-friendly: CJ Claasen 
J's Analysis of the New Business Rescue Procedure in Oakdene Square 
Properties" 2013 SALJ 44-52 
Bradstreet "Navigating Kariba" 
Bradstreet R "Navigating Kariba: Did Bad (F)acts Make Bad Law?" Paper 
presented at the Third Annual International Mercantile Law Conference (4-
6 November 2015 Bloemfontein) 
                                            
Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd (Four Creditors Intervening) 2011 5 SA 422 
(GNP) para 25; Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC) para 20. For further reflection: Sharrock, 
Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Law of Insolvency 276; Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ; 
Loubser 2010a TSAR; Loubser 2010b TSAR; Loubser 2008 SA Merc LJ; Bradstreet 
2013 SALJ; Bradstreet 2010 SA Merc LJ; Bradstreet 2011 SALJ; Bradstreet 
"Navigating Kariba"; Joubert 2013 THRHR. Pro-creditor stance to business rescue 
has uncanny resonance with judicial pronouncements in the context of restructuring 
of sovereign debt and vulture fund litigation. Of particular interest is NML Capital Ltd 
v Argentina 699 F 3d 246 (2d Cir 2012) where Griesa J adopted a rather strange 
interpretation of pari passu clause, awarding holdout creditors legal rights to ratable 
payment via a special injunction against Argentina. For a critical discussion: Wong 
2015 Colum J Transnat'l L. See eg Republic Argentina v NML Capital Ltd 134 S Ct 
2819 (2014). For serious engagement of "vulture funds", sovereign debt and human 
rights, see United Nations Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign 
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full 
Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Cephas Lumina UN Doc A.HRC/14.21 (2010). 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  16 
Bradstreet and Klopper 2014 Stell LR 
Bradstreet R and Klopper H "Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: 
Does a Section 155 Compromise Place the Bar too High?" 2014 Stell LR 
549-565 
Burdette 2004a SA Merc LJ 
Burdette D "Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and 
Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1)" 2004 SA Merc 
LJ 249-263 
Burdette 2004b SA Merc LJ 
Burdette D "Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and 
Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 2)" 2004 SA Merc 
LJ 409-447 
Cassim "Shareholder Remedies" 
Cassim MF "Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection" in Cassim MF 
et al Contemporary Company Law 2nd ed (Juta Claremont 2012) 755-823 
Chafee 1947 Mich L Rev 
Chafee Z "Coming into Equity with Clean Hands" 1947 Mich L Rev 877-906 
Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 
Christie RH and Bradfield G Christie's The Law of Contract in South Africa 
6th ed (LexisNexis Durban 2011) 
Joubert 2013 THRHR 
Joubert EP "'Reasonable Possibility' Versus 'Reasonable Prospect': Did 
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a Better Test than Judicial 
Management?" 2013 THRHR 550-563 
Kennedy 1997 U Det Mercy L Rev 
Kennedy KC "Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan 
Experience" 1997 U Det Mercy L Rev 609-656 
Kloppers 2001 SA Merc LJ 
Kloppers P "Judicial Management Reform – Steps to Initiate a Business 
Rescue" 2001 SA Merc LJ 362-378 
Koehnen Oppression and Related Remedies 
Koehnen M Oppression and Related Remedies (Thomson Carswell Toronto 
2004) 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  17 
Locke 2015 SA Merc LJ 
Locke N "The Meaning of 'Solvent' for the Purposes of Liquidation in terms 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Boschpoort Ondernemigs (Pty) Ltd v 
ABSA (Pty) Ltd" 2015 SA Merc LJ 153-162 
Lombard and Swart 2015 THRHR 
Lombard M and Swart WJC "Business Rescue: The Unsurety about 
Sureties – Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Jonker" 205 THRHR 
521-533 
Loubser 2004 SA Merc LJ 
Loubser A "Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South 
African Corporate Law" 2004 SA Merc LJ 137-163 
Loubser 2008 SA Merc LJ 
Loubser A "The Role of Shareholders during Corporate Rescue 
Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking In" 2008 SA Merc LJ 372-390 
Loubser 2010a TSAR 
Loubser A "The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 
2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 1)" 2010 TSAR 501-514 
Loubser 2010b TSAR 
Loubser A "The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 
2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2") 2010 TSAR 689-701 
Loubser Corporate Rescue 
Loubser A Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South 
African Company Law (LLD thesis Unisa 2010) 
Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ 
Loubser A "Tilting at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate 
Rescue Procedure in South African Law" 2013 SA Merc LJ 437-457 
Matlala Deregistration and Dissolution of Companies 
Matlala DM Deregistration and Dissolution of Companies: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Law and Jurisprudence (LLD Thesis University of Fort 
Hare 2015) 
Okpaluba 2002 SAPR/PL 
Okpaluba C "Extraordinary Remedies for Breach of Fundamental Rights" 
2002 SAPR/PL 98-129 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  18 
Okpaluba 2003 Stell LR 
Okpaluba C "Of 'Forging New Tools' and 'Shaping Innovative Remedies': 
Unconstitutionality of Legislation Infringing Fundamental Rights Arising from 
Legislative Omissions in the New South Africa" 2003 Stell LR 462-483 
Okpaluba 2006 SAPR/PL 
Okpaluba C "Judicial Review of Legislation in an Unfamiliar Constitutional 
Environment: The United Kingdom Experiment" 2006 SAPR/PL 263-285 
Osode "Challenging the Rejection of a Business Rescue Plan" 
Osode P "Challenging the Rejection of a Business Rescue Plan on the 
Ground of Inappropriateness of Voting Outcome under Section 153 of the 
2008 Companies Act" Unpublished paper presented at the Third Annual 
International Mercantile Law Conference (4-6 November 2015 
Bloemfontein) 
Osode 2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Osode P "Judicial Implementation of South Africa's New Business Rescue 
Model: A Preliminary Assessment" 2015 Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs 459-488 
Payne 2002 CLJ 
Payne J "'Clean Hands' in Derivative Action" 2002 CLJ 76-86 
Peterson Shareholder Remedies 
Peterson DH Shareholder Remedies in Canada (Butterworths Toronto 
1989) 
Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 
Rushworth J "A Critical Analysis of Business Rescue Regime in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008" 2010 Acta Juridica 375-408 
Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Law of Insolvency 
Sharrock R, Van der Linde K and Smith A Hockly's Law of Insolvency 9th ed 
(Juta Cape Town 2012) 
Sonnekus 2014 TSAR 
Sonnekus JC "Procurement Contracts and Underlying Principles of the Law 
– No Special Dispensation for Organs of State (Part 1 – The Principles)" 
2014 TSAR 320-336 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  19 
Strydom and Viljoen 2014 PER/PELJ 
Strydom S and Viljoen (Maas) S "Unlawful Occupation of Inner-City 
Buildings: A Constitutional Analysis of the Rights and Obligations involved" 
2014 PER/PELJ 1207-1261 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 
Van der Merwe SWJ et al Contract: General Principles 4th ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2012) 
Wong 2015 Colum J Transnat'l L 
Wong N "NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina and the Changing Roles 
of the Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt 
Agreements" 2015 Colum J Transnat'l L 396-427 
Case law 
Absa Bank v Makuna Farm CC 2014 3 SA 86 (GJ) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Summer Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 90 (GNP) 
African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 2013 6 SA 471 (GNP) 
African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd 2015 5 SA 192 (SCA) 
AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 
5 SA 515 (GS) 
AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA (No 2) 
2014 4 SA 179 (CC) 
Amdoes v Kwezi Technologies 2014 5 SA 532 (GJ) 
Apco Africa v Apco Worldwide Inc 2008 5 SA 615 (SCA) 
Brits v Van Heerden 2001 3 SA 257 (C) 
Budge v Midnight Storm Investments 2012 2 SA 28 (GSJ) 
Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson 2015 ZACC 15 (5 June 2015) 
City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) 
Cilliers v Duin & Dee (Pty) Ltd 2012 4 SA 203 (WCC) 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  20 
Davis & Co Ltd v Brunswick (Australia) Ltd 1936 1 All ER 299 (PC) 
DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz 2014 1 SA 103 (KZP) 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 1972 2 All ER 492 (HL) 
Eiserman v Ara Farms Ltd 1988 52 DLR 4th 498 
Emphy v Pacer Properties (Pty) Ltd 1979 3 SA 363 (D) 
Erasmus v Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 178 (W) 
Essop v Abdullah 1988 1 SA 424 (A) 
Ex parte Nell 2014 6 SA 545 (G) 
French Plays Ltd v The Mayor of Hackney 1910 2 KB 
Golden Pheasant Holding Corp v Synergy Corporate Management 2011 
BCSC 173 
HBT Constructors v Uniplant Hire CC 2012 5 SA 197 (FB) 
Herman v Set-Mak Civils CC 2013 1 SA 386 (FB) 
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 
Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the 
Newton Urban Village 2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ) 
Keystone Drilller Co v General Excavator Co 290 US 240 (1933) 
Kinzie v Dell Holdings 2010 BCSC 1360 
Klokow v Sullivan 2006 1 SA 259 (SCA) 
Knipe v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 52 (FB)  
Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate 2012 2 SA 378 (WCC) 
Konamaneni v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd 2002 1 WLR 1269 
Kurt v Pryde 2007 160 ACWS (3d) 94 (Ont SC) 
Kylie v CCMA 2008 9 BLLR 970 (LC) 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  21 
Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 838 (LAC) 
Moosa v Mavjee Bhawan (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 131 (T) 
Mourutzen v Greystone Enterprises 2012 5 SA 74 (KZD) 
Muller v Lilly Valley Ltd 2012 1 All SA 187 (SGJ) 
NML Capital Ltd v Argentina 699 F 3d 246 (2d Cir 2012) 
Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothsfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) 
Ltd 2013 4 SA 539 (SCA) 
Palmieri v AC Paving Co Ltd 1999 48 BLR (2d) 130 (BCSC) 
Paulson v Dogwood Holdings Ltd 1990 BCJ No 2281 (SC) 
Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 331 (GSJ) 
Petersen v Jajbhay 1940 TPD 82 
Pham Thai Duc v PTS Australian Distributor Pty Ltd 2005 NSWC 98 
Portfolios of Distinction Ltd v Laird 2004 2 BCLC 741 
Re Levine Developments (Israel) Ltd 1978 5 BLR 104 
Re Rogers and Agincourt Holdings Ltd 1976 14 OR (2d) 489; 1976 74 DLR 
3d 152 
Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd 1916 2 Ch 426 
Republic Argentina v NML Capital Ltd 134 S Ct 2819 (2014) 
Resnick v Bilecki 1986 49 Sask R 232 
Richter v Bloem CC 2014 6 SA 38 (GP) 
Ruut v Head 1996 20 CSR 160 
Safarik v Ocean Fisheries Ltd 1995 12 BCLR (3d) 342  
Scania Finance SA (Pty) Ltd v Thom-Gee Rood 2013 2 SA 439 (FB) 
Sevaal Holdings Inc v LCB Properties Inc 2014 SKQB 47 (CanLII) 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  22 
Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 
386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC) 
Sunny South Canners (Pty) Ltd v Mbangxa 2001 2 SA 49 (SCA) 
Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd (Four Creditors Intervening) 
2011 5 SA 422 (GNP) 
Sweet v Finbain 1984 3 SA 441 (W) 
Thunder Cats Investments 92 (Pty) Ltd v Nkonjane Economic Prospecting 
and Investment (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 1 (SCA) 
Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products 2013 4 SA 630 (GNP) 
Legislation 
Canada  
Business Corporations Act, 2002 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Human Rights Act, 1991 
New Zealand 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 
South Africa  
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 
of 1998 
TC MALOKA & S MUTHUGULU-UGODA PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  23 
United Kingdom 
Human Rights Act, 1998 
International instruments 
United Nations Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign 
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the 
Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Cephas Lumina UN Doc A.HRC/14.21 (2010) 
Internet sources 
Osode 2013 http://tinyurl.com/jherbhq 
Osode P 2013 Remedial Interventions in Public Procurement Processes: 
An Appraisal of Recent Appellate Jurisprudence in Search of Principles - 
Inaugural Lecture http://tinyurl.com/jherbhq accessed 18 June 2016 
List of Abbreviations 
CLJ Cambridge Law Journal 
Colum J Transnat'l L Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
KY LJ Kentucky Law Journal 
Mich L Rev Michigan Law Review 
PER/PELJ Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regstydskrif / 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SAPR/PL SA Publiekreg / SA Public Law 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
THRHR Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
U Det Mercy L Rev University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 
 
